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8 September 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

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1. I met with Mr. Bundy this afternoon at the White House and accomplished the following:

a. I informed him that we would fly our next U-2 mission over Cuba as soon as the weather was right, probably around Monday. I told him that this was our last approved one and I would be hitting him early next week for further approvals. We discussed the air defense dangers and I mentioned casually the possibility of running two planes concurrently to assist in confusing the air defenses. He felt this would require Special Group consideration and I agreed.

b. I left him the original of Attachment #1 to [redacted]. He found it entirely adequate and said he would show it to the President on Monday. (This has to do with instructions to pilots overflying Cuba, and other related subjects.)

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c. I showed him [redacted] memorandum on responses developed in connection with the recent U-2 episode over [redacted]. He was interested and said he would get the original [redacted] (OSA has) from General Taylor's office.

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[redacted]

e. I told Mr. Bundy that I had tried to put in writing the President's concern about internal uprisings in Cuba and had found it most difficult; accordingly I had passed the word orally and was sure that our people understood what was wanted. He agreed that we should not attempt to put anything in writing.

See DDCI memo for record  
11 Sep 62

[redacted]  
Copy 1 of [redacted]

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[Redacted]

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2. In addition to all the foregoing, I informed him of the recent TACKLE flight, [Redacted] and of our plans for [Redacted] tonight. I also told him that we had cranked Cuba into the next "C" shot and that we were now holding for weather. I also told him of the newly acquired Medium Range Ballistic Missile [Redacted]

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3. In connection with the recent clamp on NPIC output, I told him that as far as the general Intelligence Community was aware, this clamp had been directed by me as Acting DCI and not by any higher authority, that there were only a very limited number of people at the top echelon who knew that higher authority had in fact directed this. He seemed reassured and was happy that it had been handled in this way. We will continue this very closely held "need-to-know" activity until further notice insofar as it deals with an aggressive capability from Cuba.

4. I consider the meeting most successful and plan to do this several times a week. Mr. Knoche, please bear this in mind so that you can keep feeding me similar items of information and action for these meetings.

  
Marshall S. Carter  
Lieutenant General, USA  
Acting Director

MSC:blp

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